The changing role of Vietnam in Southeast Asia : beyond the Cold War by Pettigrew, Tenise L.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1991-06
The changing role of Vietnam in Southeast Asia :
beyond the Cold War
Pettigrew, Tenise L.








THE CHANGING ROLE OF VIETNAM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:




Thesis Advisor: Claude A. Buss
Approved for public release: Distribution is limited
92-03998
UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
Form Approved
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMBNo. 07040188
la REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION lb RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS
Unclassified
2a SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY 3 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORTApproved for public release:
2b DECLASSIFICATION /DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE Distribution is limited
4 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) S MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)
6a NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 6b OFFICE SYMBOL 7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
(If applicable)
Naval Postgraduate School NS Naval Postgraduate School
6c ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 7b ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP ode)
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 Monterey, CA 93943-5000
8a NAME OF FUNDING/ SPONSORING 8b. OFFICE SYMBOL 9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
ORGANIZATION (If applicable)
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 10 SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS
PROGRAM :PROJECT TASK WORK UNIT
ELEMENT NO I NO NO ACCESSION NO
11 TITLE (Include Security Classification)
THE CHANGING ROLE OF VIETNAM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: BEYOND THE COLD WAR
12 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)
TENISE L. PETTIGREW
13a. TYPE OF REPORT 13b TIME COVERED 14 DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 15 PAGE COUNT
Master's Thesis FROM TO JUNE 1991 98
16 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government
17 COSATI CODES 18 SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
FIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP Vietnam, United States, China, Soviet Union, national
interests, foreign policy, alliances, strategic interests
19 ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
This thesis examines the United States relationship with Vietnam in the aftermath of the
Vietnam War and the end of the Cold War. Even though Vietnam's path toward progress and
growth is hindered by internal and external security concerns, the direction is clear
that she wants to be an integral player in the Southeast Asian region. Vietn.m's dealin s
with the two regional major powers, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China,
I are addressed in respect to the historical pasts, the present interests and what the
future holds for continued relationships. A Vietnam in which the U.S. has a significant
level of involvement and influence as a result of direct relations will help ensure that
the Southeast Asian region, with all of its strategic importance, will be more favorably
balanced toward U.S. interests
20 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT 21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
0I UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED 0 SAME AS RPT 0 DTIC USERS Unclassified
22a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL 22b TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 22c OFFICE SYMBOL
Claude A. Buss 646-2521 NS
DD Form 1473, JUN 86 Previous editions are obsolete SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
SIN 0102-LF-O[4-6603 UNCLASSIFIED
i
Approved for Public Release: Distribution is Unlimited
THE CHANGING ROLE OF VIETNAM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:
BEYOND THE COLD WAR
by
Tenise L. Pettigrew
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S. Texas A&M University 1983
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of







Claude A. Buss, Thesis Advisor
David Winterford, 7econd Reader
Edward J. La~ance, Acting Chairman
Department of National Security Affairs
ii
ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the United States relationship with
Vietnam in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and the end of the Cold
War. Even though Vietnam's path toward progress and growth is
hindered by internal and external security concerns, the direction
is clear that she wants to be an integral player in the Southeast
Asian region. Vietnam's dealings with the two regional major
powers, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, are
addressed in respect to the historical pasts, the present interests
and what the future holds for continued relationships. A Vietnam
in which the U.S. has a significant level of involvement and
influence as a result of direct relations will help ensure that the
Southeast Asian region, with all of its strategic importance, will
be more favorably balanced toward U.S. interests.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. VIETNAM AND THE UNITED STATES: AT THE END OF THE
HOSTILITIES
The United States' position in Southeast Asia after
World War II was shaped primarily by its concern over the
expansion of the Soviet Union and communist China. Commu-
nist China, the creation of a communist North Korea and the
inroads of the communists into North Vietnam itself were
each viewed as evidence of spreading communism that might
eventually threaten all of Southeast Asia, Japan and possi-
bly the United States itself. The U.S. took its stand in
Vietnam where it fought for containing communism and in a
positive way, promoting the democratic way of life.
In this light, the Vietnam War was much more than a
conflict between North Vietnam and South Vietnam assisted by
the United States. It was a war of geopolitics as well as a
civil war in whi.ch the Vietnamese people suffered massive
loss- of life and property. Eleven years of war ended
without the accomplishment of specific goals and could be
described as an experience in endless frustration, wasted
1
energies and "squandered opportunities".
1
Stanley Karnow, Vietna History (New York: The Viking
Press, 1983), 629.
1
The T'rLited States official involvement in the Vietnam
War ended on January 27, 1973. The last remaining American
troops left in late March and on April 1, 1973 the last
Prisoners of War (POWs) were released. It will take still
more years to assess adequately Lhe complete effects of the
Vietnam War due to the political and emotional memories
which still surround the whole conflict. In a broader sense
there have been some recognizable influences in the evolu-
tion of United States' policy in the region . First, and
probably most important, is the general effect the war had
on the United States' policies of military involvement. For
fear of another "Vietnam", the United States was overly
cautious or gave the appearance of shying away from con-
flicts in which it might wcll have had a legiti,;ate inter-
est. An offshoot of this was the waning of credibility of
the United States as an ally. It is to be noted that the
greatest tendency to reduc? the American profile in South-
east Asia occurred in the military domain.
The oth - main effect of the Vietnam War was in a re-
gional context. For feat of a strong, militarized Vietnam
backed by the Soviet Union, the non-communist powers in the
region became evermore aware of a dangerjus threat and
responded accordingly. Increased military spending,
improved diplomatic ties and a new focus on defense
2
2industrialization all worked to shape Southeast Asia into a
different mold. Not necessarily a direct result of the
Vietnam War but clearly a response to regional changes was
the improved Sino-American relationship. This new and
improved association made an impact on other regional rela-
tionships; Soviet Union-Vietnam, China and the individual
states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
and it neccesitated new international approaches to the
solution of the conflict in Cambodia.
B. SEEKING REGIONAL STABILITY WITH METHODS APPROPRIATE AT
THE END OF THE COLD WAR
During the June 1990 superpower Summit in Washington,
President Bush stated, "We've m,?ed a long, long way from
3
the depths of the Cold War." This movement began in the
late 1980s as the world's attention focused on and has since
been captivated by the political, diplomatic and economic
changes in the socialist countries, namely the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe. .he changes took the world by surprise
in spite of the foreboding released by the events in Tianan-
man Square in the early spring. The shock waves of these
events were slow in reaching the socialist countries of the
Far East and did nct seem to impact on the dynamic, dominat-
ing economics of the region. In spite of those reasons, the
2
Bilveer Singh, "ASEAN's Arms Tadustries: Potential and
Limits, " Comparative Strategy 8, No. 2 (1989): 255.
3
David Hoffman, "Soviet Says West Can't Unilaterally
Reshape Europe," N9_w York Times, 4 June 1990, Al.
3
end of the Cold War had its own profound effect in the Far
Eastern arena. The People's Republic of China (PRC), Viet-
nam and North Korea continued to pursue their own political
and economic reform programs in spite of the failures
evidenced in Europe. But it was ever more difficult to
retain their blinders, particularly because of the changed
posture of the Soviet Union toward its Asian neighbors.
The United States involvement in regional stability in
Southeast Asia will have to factor in these international
changes, regional changes and the fact that in the entire
world it is no longer business as usual. What new tactics
will be required and will their foundations be based on
established alliances and an awareness to a "new global
4
order?" Will ideology play a less important role? Will
the United States' forward presence continue to be the
hallmark of any new policy? Poor economics and political
isolation have damaged the image of the Soviets in Southeast
Asia. What attention should we pay to the PRC as her
numerous strengths are coupled with her instability? What
deference needs to be payed to the individual countries in
Southeast Asia and should they be recognized individually
and as a group as possessing an ever increasing ability to
4
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Interna-
tional Affairs (East Asia and Pacific Region), &
Framework for the Asian P Bja. Looking Toward The
21st Century, Report To Congress ([Washington, D.C.]: U. S.
Department of Defense, April 1990), 5.
4
speak for themselves and back up their needs and demands
with political and economic strengths? With the ther major
powers who wish to play a leading role in Southeast Asia,
may we now have to take more seriously the Zone of Peace,
Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPHAN) as part of their efforts to
create more stability regionally and world wide?
In conjunction with the changes as noted above and in
keeping with the evolving new world order and diminution of
regional conflicts, what United States' presence is needed
in the region? To what extent should dom.estic budget con-
straints and changing threat perceptions be allowed to
prevent American objectives of contribution to regional
stability? These questions must be examined especially in
the light of the radical changes which took place in Eastern
Europe in the later half of the 1980s. In addition to the
dynamics of the Far East, the subsequent end of the Cold War
emphasize the importance of stability which depends in such
large measure upon the bilateral and multilateral economic,
military and diplomatic means afforded by the United States.
C. OBJECTIVE: TO ENHANCE THE UNITED STATES' POSITION IN THE
REGION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA
A study of United States' diplomatic efforts in South-
east Asia after 1975 might lead one to believe the U.S. has
less interests in this region. But the facts remain. We
fought a prolonged war in Indochina that lost in more ways
than one. The effects on the people who fought there,
5
their families and fUiends, those who sent them, those who
protested and the unknown status of those who never returned
has yet to be dealt with in a satisfactory manner even after
more than 20 years. For these reasons the United States can
not ignore Southeast Asia. It is the objective of this
thesis to explore ways and means by which the United States
can contribute more effectively to Southeast Asia as it has
been evolving since the end of the Cold War.
There are particular reasons which make Southeast Asia
and especially Vietnam important to the United States and
should encourage a greater degree of attention to Asian
policies. The United States' tradition of leadership and
assistance is particularly strong in Asia. The United States
is now more economically involved ir Asia than it is in5
Europe. In conjunction with economic concerns we are also
deeply involved in security in the Asian region. Vital Sea
Lanes of Communication (SLOCs), powers with hegemonic poten-
tial, unknown designs on the region by individual powers,
and perceived threats being reflected in military purchases
and alliances encourage the United States to continue to
provide support and balance. As has been stated by the
Assistant Secretacy of State for East Asia and the Pacific,
5
Pacific Security In = 1990s ndBAndlyoo.mi
E'uropean And Asl S Environments, Prepared for the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security
Affairs) Office of the Secretary of Defense ((Washington,
D.C.]: Department of Defense, April 27, 1990), 4.
6
"We are the dynamic balancer, the buffer force, and the
ultimate sectirity guarantor in a region of great political,
6
cultural, and historical diversity." How can the United
States remain an active, contributing player in Southeast
Asia, not for reasons of superpower ego satisfaction or our
own economic ties in the region, but in response to the
preference of those regional powers who want the U.S. to
remain as the linch pin of stability and the best hope for
progress and prosperity in Southeast Asia.
This thesis will focus on the changing role of Vietnam
and the influence of the major powers on shaping the direc-
tion of Vietnam's policies. Of the three powers involved:
the PRC, the Soviet Union and the United States, what roles
can each play in assisting Vietnam toward a more positive
and productive station in Southeast Asia? Does Vietnam have
the potential and desire to become a peaceful, contributing
neighbor? Is there a positive direction for future Sino-
Vietnamese relations or will historical differences and
ongoing territorial plague the relationship? Is Vietnam
still a strategic necessity to the Soviet Union or have
economic and diplomatic shifts in priorities moved the
alliance into troubled waters? Are the United States'
national and strategic interests in Southeast Asia strong
6
Richard H. Soloman, "Sustaining the Dynamic Balance in
East Asia and the Pacific," Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S.
Department of State, Current Policy No. 1255 (February 22,
1990): 5.
7
enough to rise above the painful aftermath of the Vietnam
War? Can the United States be a leading force behind Viet-
nam's peaceful, profitable and mutually beneficial reinte-
gration into Southeast Asia?
These questions will be addressed in this thesis through
an analysis of historical and recent events. Based on this
analysis, by way of conclusions, recommendations will be
made for a more effective American policy toward Vietnam.
8
II. THE NATIONL. INTERESTS OF VIETNAM
Centuries of military conflict, internal division and
outside intervention have contributed to the economic ruin
of Vietnam. This is not an overnight failure but one of
years, years of conflict with neighbors, world powers and
internal division. Vietnam is today one of the poorest
countries in the world but still maintains one of the larg-
est armies. The socialist framework which has been intact
since 1975 and the fall of South Vietnam has had the ground
shaken beneath it with the 1989 events in the People's
Republic of China (PRC), the Soviet Union and Eastern Eu-
rope. And much like the rest of the socialist countries
where military and foreign policy security interests once
dominated, economic security interests have become more
important to national survival. The climate for a transi-
tion such as this has never been more favorable than now.
The hardest part for Vietnam has not been recognizing that
change was in fact necessary but the uncertainties that
1
surround change itself.
So while 1989 was a dynamic year for the international
community, it was especially so for Vietnam. Socialist
governments were falling everywhere, the Soviet Union was
1
Douglas Pike,"Change and Continuity in Vietnam,"Current
History 89, No. 545 (March 1990): 117.
9
retreating to mend internal problems and Vietnam's attempts
at economic reform were being met with only limited success.
Their one ray of hope was shattered when their September,
1989 withdrawal from Cambodia did not net the desired re-
sult. It was hoped by the more reform-minded Vietnamese
leaders that the withdrawal would serve as a flag to the
international community of Vietnam's desire to become a
better neighbor. They had literally banked on the withdraw-
al resulting in lifted embargoes, increased trade and in-
vestment, and International Monetary Fund (IMF)/ World Bank
cooperation. None of which occurred. The "start of a new
2
era" for Vietnam's economy did not materialize.
Early 1990 was spent criticizing the capitalist West,
for the West was blamed for being the sole reason for so-
cialist collapses. Labels such as sabotage, interference,
spying, imperialist, anti-government support and reactionary
filled the reports from Vietnam as they apparently ig-Dred
any internal causes which might have contributed to these
collapses. It appeared much to be a defense mechanism and a
form for warning Vietnamese and those involved with matters
of Vietnam to remember that ,7hile economic reform was still
on the national agenda, attempts to change the governing of
Vietnam were forbidden.
2
"Dollars, please,"b& Eo _i 312, No. 7622 (September
30, 1989): 30.
10
The middle and later part of 1990 found Vietnam facing a
whole new diplomatic landscape. The changes made by the
Bush administration concerning the Cambodian stalemate
weighed in the Vietnamese favor. Though it was readily
apparent that there were still critical issues separating
the two countries, the positive nature of the policy changes
may contribute to a smooth transition from one of the
world's poorest countries to a stable, transitioning third
world country.
A. ECONOMIC SECURITY
The Vietnamese economy has been dedicated to waging war
and has been propped up by the Soviet Union. It is years
behind its neighbors in ASEAN and Asia. Attempts to reverse
this situation began in the later 1980s with Nguyen Van
Linh's reform plan. The emphasis was on agriculture and the
3
monetary problems of the country. This reform plan was
then followed in December 1987 by the adoption of a Foreign
Investment law. This set of laws was renowned as one of the
most liberal in Third World countries and communist coun-
tries by international economic organizations. The law
allows for "joint ventures or wholly foriegn-owned enter-
prises, favourable tax terms, and repatriation of capital
4
and profits." It has allowed a tremendous amount of
3
Pike, "Change and Continuity," 119.
4
Victor Funnell,""We Cannot Live on Theories": A Changing
Vietnam," Asian Affairs XX, Part III (October 1989): 283.
11
interaction between foreign investors eager to be the first
into Vietnam and an economy much in need of hard currency
and economic skills. Continuing efforts to make investment
in Vietnam more popular have modified the laws even more by
allowing private citizens to engage in business with for-
eigners.
The foreign investment laws, cheap labor and lack oi
competition are drawing countries from all over tc trade and
invest in Vietnam. England, Taiwan, Australia, pan,
France and most of the nations in ASEAN have been eager to
take advantage of the benefits while still being wary ol the
5
abundant problems in the Vietnamese economic 'system'
Perhaps the biggest economic problem facing Vietnam is the
lack of knowledge by the leaders of proper methods, avenues
and techniques to move the backward economy toward an econo-
my which will function profitably while still remaining
within their tight socialist guidelines. The days of deal-
6
ing with problems by "brute force" and viewing the world as
non-interdependent are virtually over for Vietnam's leaders.
The manner in which they deal with the current economic
problems will certainly affect their place in the developing
5
Jonathan Moore, "The old pais' act," Fa Estern E.cnLoM!
jc Review (Hereafter f=) (30 August 1990): 46-47; "Another
quagmire," The Ecnms (April 7, 1990): 81-82; and "Viet-
nam-Economic Recovery," Asian Recorder XXXVI, No. 6 (Febru-
ary 5-11, 1990): 20997.
6
Pike, "Change and Continuity,", 118.
12
regional and world order for economics is becoming a criti-
cal coverning issue on the international agenda.
1. Current Problems Affecting the Economy
The Cambodian conflict was an effort that neither the
Vietnamese nor their economic and military aid donor, the
Soviet Union, could afford. Much of the economic problems
of Vietnam stem from the burden of an extended and external
conflict, easily managed by leaders who were accustomed to
planning a wartime economy and still receiving aid to fi-
nance their efforts. Changes in the Cambodian conflict have
been made. Vietnam is no longer involved militarily in
Cambodia but is now heavily engaged diplomatically. The
Soviet Union's aid to both Vietnam and the Hun Sen regime in
Cambodia has been drastically reduced in order to support
7
Soviet diplomatic pursuits in the region The military
disengagement from Cambodia would appear to be a positive
factor on the economy, freeing up capital to be dedicated to
other programs, similar to the United States' 'peace divi-
dend'. The transition has been cumbersome and results are
not as yet readily apparent.
Some of the major internal factors greatly affecting
the economic performance of Vietnam can be summed into one
category: lack of adequate infrastructure to handle
7
Murray Hiebert, "Hammer blow for Hanoi," FEER (5 July
3.990): 44-45.
13
efficient and effective economic reform programs. The
'system' in Vietnam which is supposed to ensure a smooth
running socialist economy is beset with apparently unremova-
ble kinks. Failure of business endeavors to produce effec-
tively and now profitably has been attributed to a weak
banking system, lack of management and management skills,
shortages of foreign currency and demand by countries trad-
ing in Vietnam for hard currency, comparatively poor quality
products not able to compete with imports, and an inadequate
8
transportation system. The currency prcblem in Vietnam is
dangerous. Even though inflation, once at an all time high
of 700%, has been gradually reduced as a result of the
devaluation of the Dong and the reduction of government
subsidies, there is still enough inflation to encourage
smuggling and black markets.
The lack of economic, technical and bureaucratic
infrastructure capable of dealing with exploiting f-he coun-
try's resources has come to light very recently 4ith the
crisis in the Middle East oil countries of Iraq and Kuwait.
Vietnam has very large quantities of coal resources and is
willing to allow joint ventures to mine the coal and other
resources.
8
Murray Hiebert, "Crisis in the Making," E (5 July
1990): 45.
14
However, it lacks the structure to remove, transport, ship
9
or regulate the conceivaby profitable energy resource.
Unemployment and related problems still continue to
plague the economy. As a result of the Cambodian withdraw-
al, thousands of Vietnamese soldiers were demobilized with
only a small percentage finding employment in the civilian
10
sector . The unem'loyment problem has been compounded by
those laid off as a result of the "ren'vations" being at-
tempted within the economy and the grow-.ng number of return-
ing and returned overseas Vietnamese. The estimated value
of remittances sent by overseas workers is about "$200ii
million a year to Vietnam". As the socialist countries in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union close their doors to
foreign workers to make room for domestic workers, this
massive return of laborers means more unemployment as well
as a considerable loss of revenues for the government. In
addition to being an economic nightmare, it has caused
political and diplomatic problems. It is feared by the
Vietnamese leaders that the workers may be returniney with
12
"revolution in their luggage" and the negative atmosphere
9
Murray Hiebert, "Shaft of light," (21 October
1990): 71.10Murray Hiebert, "Not fading away," F (19 October
1989): 21.
11
"Redundant workers, going cheap," The Economist 315, No.




surrounding the oversea Vietnamese and the valuable jobs
they have been taking away from locals in these foreign
13
countries may have an unpleasant diplomatic backlash.
Along with the workers being sent home from the
Soviet Union has been the reduction in Soviet aid. With the
serious decline in aid, trade and subsidies, the Vietnamese
leadership iz faced with fighting another contributing
factor to the struggling economy. Evidence of harder times
as a result of the aid reduction is being seen in price
increases, decreases in supplies, and rationing of critical
14
commodities. Where once Vietnam received at reduced
prices and at favorable terms such commodities as oil,
steel, fertilizer and cotton, they are now having to use
hard currency and at world market prices.
2. Attempts To Improve the Economy
The list of economic problems facing Vietnam's lead-
ership is extensive and has clearly not been provided in its
entirety in the previous section. However, a few steps have
been made by Vietnam to provide hope that it may in fact
overcome the more pronounced problems and join in on the
economic progress of East Asia. Acknowledgment of some of
the problems by the Vietnamese leadership is by far the most
13
Murray Hiebert, "Comrades go home," f= (17 May 1990):
20-21.
14
"Ho Chi Mnh City Gas Rationed; Prices 'Soar'," F$
E (1 September 1990): 73.
16
important step taken. The foreign investment laws and
increased dealing with capitalist countries and markets, and
private individuals have brought about a new awareness of
international economic interdependence, some of which Viet-
namese officials appear to be willing to accept in modera-
tion. A renewed interest in the economic and business
skills of the southern part of the country, once condemned
and partially destroyed for its capitalist ways, is more
15
proof of the changing socialist economic agenda.
One of the major highlights of Vietnam's economic
reform efforts has been the reemergence of the country as
one of the top rice exporters in the world, this only a year
after some northern parts of the country nearly starved to
death. There are still many weaknesses to surmount. The
challenges of breaking into the rice market, finding clien-
tele, weeding out the non-serious companies, improving the
low quality, dealing with bureaucratic mingling, and reduc-
16
tion in Soviet fertilizer will be difficult to overcome.
However, the momentum which made Vietnam the third largest
exporter seems to have lingered into 1990, making this
export a possible avenue upward.
Businessmen, foreign government diplomats and tour-
ists are being cordially courted to visit Vietnam. The year
15
Funnell,"Cannot Live on Theories," 280.
16
Murray Hiebert,"The tilling fields," FEER (10 May
1990): 32-33.
17
1990 was even designated "Visit Vietnam Year". However,
once they arrive, the tourists find themselves greeted with
an inadequate supply of hotel rooms, exorbitant prices and
facility conditions which might only encourage one to seek
travel or business elsewhere. The hotel ventures have not
only proven to be insufficient for patrons but even more of
a problem for those who finance, invest and manage these
enterprises. Stifling bureaucracy, corruption and govern-
ment to government mistrust have brought to failure many of
the attempts at profitable tourism. If one accepts that an
outsider's opinion of a country's inner workings may be
tainted through his unpleasant accommodations, then the
tourism business will need a high priority to alleviate this
problem. Two of the more successful attempts in the hotel
business have been the Saigon Floating hotel and the old
French Metropole in Hanoi, renamed Thong Nhat Hotel, both
joint ventures.
Another avenue which warrants significant attention
is the profitable exploits of the oil deposits of the Viet-
namese coast and in the highly controversial areas surround-
ing the Spratly and Paracel islands. The Soviet Union is
17
presently finding mild success in this joint arena. With
oil being a dynamic and critical international subject,
17
"Joint Soviet-SRV Firm Discovers Oil Deposit,"
FBIS-EAS-90-181 (18 September 1990): 73.
18
Vietnam may find bilateral discussions on this subject
opening doors that were once locked tight.
Finally, a very important component of Vietnam's
economic recovery which is directly linked to its programs,
initiatives and progress but not totally in its hands, is to
be found in the review by the IMF. This review of "Viet-
18
nam's economic-adjustment programme" is critical to her
loan and investment future. With continued pressure from
the United States to deny Vietnam access to IMF and World
Bank lending, many countries who desire a relationship with
Vietnam have been restrained. This includes numerous agen-
cies within the United States itself. Even though the
crucial blockade is still lead by the United States, domes-
tic structural improvements will be important for eventual
integration and future stability.
B. POLITICAL SECURITY
The political control of Vietnam is still in the hands
of the communist party. The ability of the party to govern
and lead the country has probably never been more difficult.
The events of 1989 in the socialist world, internal party
personnel changes, and changes in regional issues and al-
liances have taxed the ability of the party, a party which
18
Susuma Awanohara, "Playing for time," FEER (20 Septem-
ber 1990): 94.
19
is already under considerable pressure to keep control of an
impoverished country.
The Sixth National Party Congress in December 1986 was
the beginning of the leadership transformation from revolu-
tionaries and conservatives to reformers, or as Douglas Pike
puts it, "from non-risk takers to risk takers". It was
agreed that economic and state/party relationship reforms
must occur but the speed and ability to govern the reforms
were not so apparently clear. Another issue which created
division in the party is the priorities placed on national
security and respectable independence, and economic inter-
ests. The different groupings within the party each have
their individual agendas and security concerns, number one
being their own secure position.
Ronald Cima summarizes the situation quite well. "To
the ideological conservatives, relinquishing the -arty's
tight hold on the economy to the vagaries of the marketplace
is perceived as an invitation to chaos and anarchy; to the
bureaucrats, reform means changing the status quo and
threatening the established and often corrupt power
hierarchy; and to the military, it represents a threat to
national security because it diminishes the importance of
19
military strength in favor of economic development."
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If one accepts the notion that Vietnam's greatest prob-
lem is the poor status of its economy, one should also
accept the notion that the political future of the country
is most disquieting because of its unpredictability. Their
socialist brethren in Eastern Europe have fallen, the Soviet
Union has admitted to the failures of socialist economic
planning and the PRC has been besieged by international
condemnation for the Tiananmen massacre as they "dealt" with
the growing pains of reform. While socialist regimes all
about them were troubled, Vietnam's leaders continuously
emphasized to both internal and external audiences, that
these radical political changes were not to occur in Viet-
nam. The economic reform plan was the farthest extent to
which any reforms would be taken.
Central to this issue of political reform has been the
issue of multi-party government. Internal political opposi-
20
tion is fervently opposed. The ruling "gerontocracy" of
the Vietnamese Communist Party made it quite clear during
the events of late 1989 and early 1990, that there would be
no opposition to its rule. This was based on its assumption
that political opposition would result in instability,
21
further hampering the economic reform programs underway.
These views have not stopped the creation of opposition
20
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groups, the most famous being the Club of Former Resistance
Fighters. It is a group which is made up of mostly southern,
very popular war leaders who claim to support the Vietnamese
Communist Party but have difficulty with some methods,
22
practices and performances of the leadership
As the line between economic and political reform grows
thinner, the challenge to the party will become ever great-
er. The economic successes/failures and performance in
dealing with a changed international environment may estab-
lish a secure position for the party and its leaders or may
drive them toward a position with their backs to the wall.
It is not clear what either of these positions would moti-
vate the party leaders to do. Instability is by far the
most undesirable avenue for the country, the region or the
world community.
C. DOMESTIC SECURITY
Vietnam is not unlike most countries that place their
own national security above all else. Ho Chi Minh was best
able to express this and his writings, speeches and lectures
are zealously used today by those trying to justify change
or continuity for Vietnam's national security policies.
They still appear to be on a determined course toward so-
cialism. Similar to the economic and political security
22
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interests, internal security interests will affect the
winding of this course. A very important factor when con-
sidering these domestic security interests is that even
though they may be getting more publicized attention they
immediately will take a back seat if the safety of Vietnam
23
is threatened.
Still high on the list of concerns are the events taking
place concerning Cambodia. Cambodia appears to have changed
from a military threat to a political threat, in that if a
peaceful coalition government fails to appear, Vietnam will
continue to bear a major proportion of international condem-
nation for the failure. A positive turn in the Cambodian
issue was reached in Jakarta on 10 September 1990. The four
factions agreed to a U.N. formulated plan to set up a 12-
member Supreme National Council (SNC). Reporting on the
Jakarta meetings of early September, the Vietnamese national
daily, NHAN DM, comments favorably on the conclusion. The
report emphasized the important part played by the govern-
ment of Hun Sen and the continued positive efforts by Viet-
nam to contribute to a peaceful settlement and stability in
24
Southeast Asia. A settlement in favor of the Vietnamese,
i.e. strong Hun Sen government representation, should allow
attention to be diverted from that interest to more urgent
23
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domestic interests. A settlement not favorable to Vietnam
may unfortunately do the opposite.
Another domestic concern is the consequences surrounding
the large demobilization effort underway in Vietnam. While
a strong, large armed force may have attributed to a secure
feeling inside Vietnam, it did nothing for the security
concerns of its neighbors in Southeast Asia. A reduction in
forces may produce favorable results in foreign relations
while not necessarily jeopardizi,,g internal security as
military tensions are reduced significantly in the region.
However, the rapid, sizable demobilization of the Vietnamese
Armed Forces, though regionally popular and economically
necessitated, are causing problems which are not easily
addressed by a government already taxed by a poor economy,
25
dwindling aid and continued international inattention.
A severe domestic problem which is adversely affecting
the economic, domestic and diplomatic interests is the lack
of an adequate legal system. Problems which have been
identified with the legal reforms now being attempted by
Vietnam include "resistance from Government officials",
"shortage of trained lawyers and judges", a lack of "legal
tradition" and "difficulties in establishing a judiciary
25
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independent of political pressures." None of these being
quickly or easily solvable, they will have to be addressed
prior to success in any prolonged social or economic pro-
grams dependent upon an effective legal system. This at-
tempt to establish a legal system which will protect not
only the Vietnamese people but foreigners, specifically
investors, has been met with much resistance and ignorance.
Mixing the domestic security concerns of Vietnam with
those concerns on a regional plane, especially those ex-
pressed by the progressive and successful economic coun-
tries, is becoming increasing popular. Nguyen Co Thach has
repeatedly expressed his views on this, that it is a natural
and feasible direction for Vietnam. The concept that Viet-
nam has been all along and will continue to be independent
is also apparent, continuing to glorify Ho Chi Minh's lega-
cy. "Regionalism is becoming more popular, which means that
the push for cooperation, economic integration included, by
countries having favourable geographic conditions can over-
27
come the barriers of military-political alliances."
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D. VIETNAM'S FOREIGN POLICY CONCERNS
A resolution of the Congress says that the goal of the
foreign policy of our party and the state is to ensure
favorable international conditions and use the moment
for the utmost concentration of efforts for the solu-
tion of the tasks involved in the gradual stabilization
of the situation and the establishment of a basis for
economic development in the next 10 to 15 years, the
construction of socialism and the defence of national
independence, an active contribution to the general
struggle of nations for peace, national independence,
democracy and socialism. These are the strategic goals
and supreme interests of the party and the entire
Vietnamese people.
28
These statements capture the complex Vietnamese foreign
policy of wanting to be part of the international community
as long as it is clearly understood that Vietnam's independ-
ence is of the utmost concern. While Vietnamese officials
are willing to go so far as to admit that a more stable,
peaceful international environment is needed to help their
economy they are not willing to go as far as Gorbachev has
gone. They recognize there have been major changes in the
socialist countries and between major alliances, requiring a
change in their foreign policy. In light of changes within
the Soviet Union and s'bsequent pressures from that country
in conjunction with internal pressures, Vietnam made a major
diplomatic and political move by withdrawing its troops from
Cambodia. Unfortunately, this diplomatic gesture did not




worked in Vietnam's favor by allowing them to use it as an
example of its peaceful intentions within the region.
1. Vietnam/PRC Diplomatic Relations
Sino-Vietnamese diplomatic relations have been most
recently guided by the events designed to settle the Cambo-
dian conflict. The PRC's support of the Khmer Rouge and
Vietnam's armed forces in Cambodia and support of the Hun
Sen government have long kept the two countries at a stand-
off. With the Cambodian issue in the hands of the U.N.,
improved relations between the two countries have been small
but iignificant. The speculations and since confirmed
reports of a high level visit in early September 1990, by
Vietnamese government officials to Peking are a sign of a
warming. The visit was supposed to have been made by Nguyen
Van Linh, Premier Do Muoi and Pham Van Dong to discuss
Cambodian issues and normalized relations between Vietnam
29
and the PRC. Even the invitation and attendance by Vo
Nguyen Giap and the Vietnamese sport team at the Asian Games
is of a significant nature.
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2. Vietnam/USSR Diplomatic Relations
The alliance with the Soviet Union provided Vietnam
with a strong deterrent to Chinese aggression and a politi-
cal excuse to ignore the nations in Southeast Asia which had
long criticized Vietnam's foreign policies and had attempted
to influence Vietnam's actions.
The historical Vietnamese view of its alliance with
the Soviet Union is laced with its concern for betrayal but
more so recently. Through different forms of media, they
continue to pay homage to the Soviet Union for its primary
30
place in the 3icialist world. However, the tensions which
have always been present between the two countries because
of their differences, have been raised to a higher level due
to the internal changes within the Soviet Union, the de-
crease in aid and support for Vietnam and the perceived
betrayals. Vietnam is very attuned to the differences in
opinion between the Soviet Union and itself in matters
31
concerning regional affairs. Betrayal rings clear when
Vietnam views the strong encouragement received from the
Soviets to better its relations with the PRC, its historical
foe and again after Gorbachev made his speech at Krasnoyarsk
in September 1988. The hot response from Hanoi was that Cam
30
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Ranh Bay was not a Soviet pawn to be used in the super power
32
chess game in Southeast Asia.
3. Vietnam/U.S. Diplomatic Relations
Up until 18 July 1990, there had been little to no
diplomatic relations between Vietnam and the United States
with the exception of effcrts on POW/MIA issues. Prior to
the United States' change on direct discussions with Viet-
nam and Hun Sen on Cambodia, the embargo led by the United
States had clearly defined the U.S. position with regards to
Vietnam. There was to be no recognition. For Vietnam,
improved relations with the United States can only shorten
the distance between their current situation and improved
economy. The United States is the vital block to the eco-
nomic embargo marginally in place over Vietnam, to renewed
ties with IMF and the World Bank, and American invest%;at
greatly needed and apparently ready to go. During Foreign
Minister Nguyen Co Thach's visit to Washington,D.C. in
October 1990, he discussed with John Vessey, Jr. future
efforts on coordinated POW/MIA issues. The Foreign Minister
took the -rime opportunity of reiterating the theme of
resuming "diplomatic relations with the United States and an
32
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end to a 15 year old trade embargo". For Vietnam, rela-
tions with the United States will be more economically
profitable than political.
4. Direction of Vietnam's Foreign Policy
Crisis rests on the fringes in Vietnam. Nothing is
secure in their world, change in the international environ-
ment is pressuring reciprocal change within the country
which is reluctant, unsure and unable to deal with it effec-
tively. Vietnam does seek a brighter, more successful
future for itself. However, as long as it is plagued by its
economic insufficiencies, political obstinance and national
security concerns it will continue to "hobble itself for its
34
journey into the future."
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III HISTORICAL ENEMIES - PRC AND VIETNAM
Sino-Vietnamese history has primarily consisted of
geographical and political disputes intermittently strewn
with very brief periods of 'friendship and cooperation'.
The new era of relations between the PRC and Vietnam should
not be placed on the same scale as the new and friendlier
relations being experienced in the international arena. The
historical differences of these two countries will likely
make the path toward peaceful coexistence very rocky. This
chapter will deal with relations between the PRC and Vietnam
during the Vietnam War and the Sino-Vietnamese War, the
Soviet-Vietnamese alliance, the PRC in Southeast Asia, and
prospects for the future relationship between Vietnam and
the PRC.
A. CONFLICTS IN INDOCHINA
During most of the 1950s, China and the Soviet Union
equally supported socialist revolutions and communist par-
ties, North Vietnam being a significant recipient. Chinese
military assistance and aid to communist Vietnam began as
early as 1954 during North Vietnam's war with the French.
It remained limited to military equipment such as trucks and
arms, of which both were in large supply in China. From
1954 to 1956, North Vietnam was dependent upon China for
advice and assistance due in part to the communist success
31
in China and the strong pro-Chinese leaders in the North
Vietnamese government. However, history demanded they
remain cautious of the Chinese because for "centuries
1
(Chinese) had conquered, occupied or dominated them."
Beginning in the late 1950s, North Vietnam began to look
more to the Soviet Union. A rift had begun between the
Soviet Union and the PRC over leadership of world communism.
North Vietnam wavered between the two, playing each' for
increased aid and support. Even as late as 1963, North
Vietnam followed the Chinese path of refusing to sign the
Nuclear Defense Treaty thus paving the way for increased
2
Chinese aid, especially Chinese arms.
1. Vietnam War (1964-1973)
From its beginning, North Vietnam attempted to limit
its diplomatic, military and economic ties to the Soviet
Union, China and other communist countries. Unbalanced
alliances conflicted with the independent nature of Ho Chi
Minh and the desire to remain unhampered. At the same time,
Vietnam had several things in common with these countri :s.
A predominant goal for Vietnam was ridding the country 4nd
the region of the United States and its 'imperialist.-'
influence. And, Vietnam needed outside help.
1
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Chinese aid to North Vietnam during Vietnam's war
with the United States was given to help the "socialist
revolution" but also to "counter Soviet influence". Chinese
aid was an instrument in the growing Sino-Soviet rift. In
1964, Deng Xiaoping even went so far as to offer the Vietna-
mese one billion dollars a year if they would refuse all
3
Soviet aid and only accept Chinese assistance.
The division between China and North Vietnam began as
the Sino-Soviet estrangement strengthened. The Soviet Union
took advantage of Chinese domestic problems by increasing
the quantity and quality of its military supplies and weap-
onry, far surpassing anything the Chinese could supply.
Then in 1966, the distance from China was stretched even
further due to the questions being disputed over whether
Chinese transportation of Soviet military equipment was
being properly handled. By the end of the war in 1973, the
unification of the country in 1975, and the strengthening
position of the Chinese backed Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, the
Vietnamese looked solely to the Soviet Union.
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2. War with Vietnam (17 February 1979 - 5 March 1979)
Early on the morning of 17 February 1971 the Chinese
People's Liberation Army (PLA) moved across the Sino-Vietna-
mese border to "teach Vietnam a lesson." The objectives or
military goals were not readily apparent, but it was clear
that the PLA meant to carry out this "counter attack in
self-defence" successfully. The slow, poorly-equipped,
unseasoned PLA was hardly a match for the military forces of
Vietnam that had seen continuous action for over twenty
years. A true test of sustainability was not to be had
because once it was decided by Beijing that it had achieved
its objective Chinese forces simply left Vietnam. After the
taking of Lang Son by the PLA, it was officially declared as
the goal and on 5 March 1979, the PLA was ordered to with-
4
draw. The war was over on 15 March when the last PLA
forces left Vietnam.
More important than the actual conflict and whether
goals were met, is the stimulus behind the invasion. These
reasons might possibly give some insight as to whether
future conflicts might occur if underlying causes are still
apparent. China's war with Vietnam began as early as 1975.
Territorial disputes in the Paracel and Spratly Islands, the
Gulf of Tonkin, and along their common land border took the
Sino-Vietnamese relationship on a new tack. During 1977 and
4
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1978, other major issues surfaced to make a conflict imni-
nent.
One ot the major issues dealt with the ethnic Chinese
population living in Vietnam which was estimated at around
1.5 million. Composed mostly of wealthy merchants and
bvusinessmen (many of whom were loyal to Taiwan), they were
adversely affected by Hanoi's voidance of private enterprise
5
and trading in March 1978. This large Hoa population, who
lived primarily in the South, and many of whom refused to
give up their Chinese citizenship, were caught in a volatile
situation. A mass exodus to Hong Kong, China or any friend-
ly country in Southeast Asia was made by thousands of Chi-
nese. Mainland China accepted all ethnic Chinese refugees,
whether loyal to Beijing or Taiwan. Some were successful
but many never made it out of the country or to another,
probably being lost at sea. By May, all Chinese aid and6
government technicians were withdrawn.
In November 1978, the Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship
Treaty was signed. Later that year, the Vietnamese invaded
Cambodia in a retaliatory effort against the Khmer Rouge.
In February 1979, the PRC invaded Vietnam. Vietnam's treat-
ment of its Chinese population, the Soviet-Vietnamese
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alliance, and the invasion of Cambodia were major factors.
It was anticipated by the Chinese that their northern inva-
sion might also relieve some of the pressure off their
Cambodian allies by drawing Vietnamese forces away. The
invasion was also perceived to be a logistical and tactical
test, there was a "desire to test the PLA, which had not
7
conducted extensive combat operation since 1962." Underly-
ing the whole conflict, was a need for China's leaders to
8
reassert their claim to regional leadership. Their histor-
ical place in the world had been threatened by a strong
showing of Vietnamese abilities and power in the past years
and this was met as a challenge. The result was a military
conflict with historical precedence.
The debates still rage as to whether Chinese goals
were met, of who won and who lost, and of the number of
casualties on each side. This is due in part to the heated
political side of the war caused by the Sino-Vietnamese-
Soviet triangle. Many of the reasons for the war are still
evident, though to a lesser extent. Prospects for the
future will have to take these into consideration.
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B. ACTIONS AS A RESULT OF SOVIET VIETNAMESE ALLIANCE
In the late 1970s, China viewed the Soviet interest in
the Far East to be hegemonic. It was not so much an ideo-
9
logical struggle between the two as a power struggle. Each
was vying for power in the region. To combat the perception
that the Soviet Union was threatening China's security by a
power struggle and encirclement, the PRC sought influence
10
through alliances, especially with the United States.
1. Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Treaty
The Soviet-Vietnamese alliance signed into being in
November 1978 added fuel to an already growing fire. There
was concern over the growing strength of Vietnam. Vietnam's
armed forces were strengthened through the military aid and
advanced military equipment it received from the Soviet
!i
Union. Another of China's concerns about the alliance was
the Soviet military basing in Vietnam. The bases were
viewed as being detrimental to future Sino-Soviet relations,
as a strategic basis from which a Soviet assault could be
launched on the PRC and as a menace to Chinese naval
9
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power. After the treaty, the Chinese recognized that
Soviet leadership placed priority on its alliance with
Vietnam because of its strategic value, giving secondary
ranking to its giant Asian neighbor.
The Chinese retaliated by placing the 'three obsta-
cles' (Afghanistan, Cambodia and Soviet troops along the
Soviet border) in the way of future Sino-Soviet relations.
These requirements placed detente at a safe distance and in
the Soviet's court. It gave the Chinese time to study what
Soviet true intentions might be in their region of the
world. Though overtures were made to place Sino-Soviet
relations on friendlier terms, the Chinese remained skepti-
cal in light of Soviet activities in Afghanistan and South-
13
east Asia.
2. Gorbachev and Sino-Soviet Detente
Mikhail Gorbachev's succession to Soviet leadership
in March 1985 turned the Sino-Soviet relationship 180 de-
grees. This was immediately met with some concern by the
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Soviet military encirclement of China continues" or did
until Gorbachev made such radical initiatives to reduce
tensions between the two socialist countries. Chinese
acceptance of Gorbachev's initiatives was slow in the begin-
ning but by early 1989 Beijing was inclined to accept the
initiatives and had adjusted its foreign policy accordingly.
Crucial to this transformation was the Soviet Union's abili-
ty to generate tangible results from diplomatic proposals.
"For Gorbachev, the road to Asia very clearly lay
15
through Beijing." As a result, great efforts were made to
have a successful Sino-Soviet summit in May 1989. The
summit was seen from the beginning to be a Chinese success,
it appeared they had made the Soviet Union come to them on
16
t.eir terms. For the communist leadership of China, the
summit was evidence to both domestic and international
audiences of their effective leadership and progressive
reform programs. But as the summit ended, Gorbachev's
stealing of the show did nothing for the Chinese leaders but
make matters in Tiananmen Square even worse.
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While Sino-Soviet detente may be Gorbachev's greatest diplo-
17
matic achievement, Chinese national interests have turned
politically inward.
C. THE PRC AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
The PRC has been attempting and continues to strive for
modernization. The individual countries of Southeast Asia
and the region as a whole, play a very important part in
this Chinese goal. In Southeast Asia, the economic, politi-
cal, domestic and military ties between the countries make
the region prone to great fluctuations between economic
growth, diplomatic dissarray and military strength. The PRC
needs stability and assistance which are disproportionately
available from Southeast Asia.
Southeast Asia is also considered by the PRC to be a
great security concern. Threats from the region have been
centered around a Soviet supported Vietnam. As a result, the
PRC supported the Khmer Rouge in its struggle against Viet-
namese forces. This was also in keeping with China's costly
program of supporting Third World countries. Where once the
PRC was drawn to Third World countries to improve its power
position within the socialist and international structures,
the imperatives of economics is lessening this drive.
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In this scenario, the countries of ASEAN have become
increasingly important. Chinese relations with these coun-
tries had been traditionally poor due to Chinese involvement
in domestic and political affairs in the 1960s, especially
in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. In the 1980s, China's
relations with ASEAN improved somewhat because the PRC's
stand on Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia coincided with
that of ASEAN'. Today, China's interest in ASEAN stems
primarily from economic needs. Better relations should
result in needed markets, investment, and technology trade.
Needed political and diplomatic contact may also be met
since China has suffered from international condemnation
after June 1989 and still needs friends against Vietnam for
its position on a future Cambodia. In addition, the ques-
tion over the Spratlys may be answered either militarily or
diplomatically depending on the relationshi_i held by China
and ASEAN.
Cambodia has for the most part been the only issue
focussing the attention of the PRC on ASEAN in recent years.
Though ASEAN and the PRC held similar conditions for settle-
ment of the issue and future governance of the country, many
of the countries were not convinced of China's motives or
future intentions. Having Vietnam withdraw from Cambodia
was a mutual concern, but a return to power by a Chinese-
supported Khmer Rouge was not a desired alternative. There-
fore, China's influence on the Khmer Rouge to accept U.N.
41
decisions contributed to a more positive ASEAN outlook on
Chinese intentions as well as improving relations with other
18
regional players, namely Vietnam and the Soviet Union.
Another important issue between China and individual
countries in Southeast Asia has centered primarily around
ethnic Chinese living in these countries. In the past these
Chinese populations have been the cause of domestic politi-
cal problems and are still of concern today. As mentioned
before, this issue has kept Sino-Indonesian and Sino-Singa-
porean relations at a very cool distance until very recent-
ly. The PRC and Indonesia after sign:.ng a Memorandum of
Understanding in August 1990 have restored diplomatic rela-
tions. Talks between China and Singapore have also led to
diplomatic normalization.
The final issue concerns China's future great power
status in the region. One of the key questions as a result
of the warming Sino-Soviet relationship is what would be the
world reaction to a renewed PRC interest in the domination
of regional and border states if fear of a Soviet challenge
19
is reduced. This issue reaches to the island disputes in
the South China Seas. China now seeks to ally itself with
ASEAN by making diplomatic gestures toward solving, by
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peaceful means, some of the territorial disputes over the
islands. This new direction is a result of beginning to
20
lose the only other common bond - Cambodia. An unchal-
lenged domination over the direction of events in Southeast
Asia may prove unfavorable for Vietnamese needs and desires.
D. VIETNAM AND THE PRC, PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
Chinese foreign policy has been noted for its wild
21
swings within relatively short time periods. Even though
it is not a'one, its influence as a major player in the
international community and especially .- the Far East make
it all that more significant. The relationship between the
PRC and Vietnam is still very formal and not yet close to
coming to terms with historical disagreements or pressing
issues of the ruture.
According to some writers, the PRC has a long record of
22
"slapping others in the face and getting away with it."
The Soviet Union has stood by while the PRC 'punished' its
ally. Southeast Asia, the United States and many others in
the international community have virtually stood by as human
rights were blatantly violated. For what ever individual
political, economic or diplomatic reasons, it appears no one
20
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would rather say anything too critical against Chinese
advances that possibly endanger relations or risk military
confrontation.
1. Disputes in the South China Seas
The five countries which lay claim to some portion of
the Spratly Islands are Taiwan, the PRC, Vietnam, Malaysia
and the Philippines. Of the five, only the Philippines and
Malaysia claim specific islands or groupings as opposed to
the entire island complex in the South China Sea. Iricon-
sistency in the claimants is due to "the legal doctrine of
terra nullius - areas subject to occupation and claim of
23
ownership by the occupant." The growing interest in the
Spratly Islands can be attributed to three reasons: "first-
ly, it encompasses a vast, integrated geographical area
located strategically in the South China Sea; secondly, it
is rich in marine resources; and thirdly, it may contain
24
huge under-sea deposits of oil and natural gas."
Beginning in late 1985, the PRC intensified its
interest and presence in the area through naval deployments
and scientific research projects. The result was reciprocal
military responses by the other claimants increasing the
23
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level of cognizance, which before had been relatively quiet.
On 14 March 1988, a small but significant naval and amphib-
ious clash took place on one of the islands contested by
Vietnam and the PRC. Who started it and how it started vary
from report to report. However, it is clear the Chinese
received a military victory as well as a psychological one-
upmanship. The result of the March 1988 naval encounter was
a stepped up effort to reinforce military construction,
increased patrolling and presence, further island grabbing,
and continued threats/counter-threats over claims and right-
ful possession.
Due to the difficult nature of retaining possession
of the small islands remotely separated from any significant
land, the area is burdened by instability, thus a concern
for increased military encounters. Circumstances which will
contribute to continued verbiage exchange vice military
exchange include size of the islands area, the great dis-
tance from all claimants, the relative lack of effective
naval abilities by any of the claimants, large number of
forces required to take the whole archipelago, and the
25
positive international climate.
However, there are other factors which make the even
tuality of future military encounters possible, es..-.dlly




areas specifically related to defense of the islands, con-
tinuing efforts to fortify and improve existing facilities,
and modifications to procurement of military equipment
designed to fight expressly in a Spratlys-type environment
are seen in both Vietnamese and Chinese camps.
A significant proposal offered by Dr. Mark Valencia
of the East-West Center in Honolulu is to create an interna-
tionalized regime "established to eliminate conflict, and
facilitate exploration and development of resources, the
management of fisheries and the maintenance of environmental
26
quality." The benefits of this would be the demilitariza-
tion of the area and the possible inclusion of the United
States and Soviet Union in the peripheral border of this
regime. The chances of this proposal meeting total agree-
ment by all parties is slim. The circumstances warranting
negotiations between the claimants are not there. Stepping
up to the bargaining table is seen as disadvantageous, the
claims are supported at different military levels and the
disproportional positions of strength and weakness will draw
some in and turn others off.
"At the moment, there is a military stalemate in the
27
area." This may continue for economic reasons. The
countries involved may not be able to afford military
26
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engagement or be willing to jeopardize economic ties and
programs by alienating themselves over territorial disputes.
The stalemate may also continue for political reasons. The
benefits of fighting for individual claims in the Spratlys
may still be outweighed by the benefits of diplomatic rela-
tions. The future stability of Southeast Asia may rest in
the Spratlys.
2. World Power Status of the PRC?
Since the Tiananmen massacre, Beijing has made great
efforts both regionally and globally to improve its diplo-
matic status. High on the regional list have been Indone-
sia, Singapore and lately Vietnam. The key to this need for
better diplomatic relations may be two-fold: for economic
reasons, to continue economic reform, promote investment and
trade within the PRC and foreign markets; for geopolitical
reasons, the PRC may need an improved role and level of
recognition as a great power.
The rearrangements which have occurred in the inter-
national community have diminished the influence of China's
role as a major world power. China's role in the 'strategic
triangle' has also weakened with the subsequent diminution
of the triangle itself. These changes influence the Chinese
communist party's "mission to restore China to its rightful
47
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place in the world." China's goal of placing national
interests above all and Vietnam's highly independent nature
place the future relationship on unpredictable and rather
unstable ground. It is not the type of foundation on which
to base a country's future bilateral relationship.
If normalization occurs between Vietnam and the PRC
it will not be based on friendship or trust but on a mutual
desire for a stable environment from which the communist
parties of each country may continue their individual reform
programs. Tran Quang Co, Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minis-
ter, stated the government's basis for normalization rested
in the "importance to the long-term and fundamental inter-
ests of the two countries. That policy is also in the
interest of durable peace and stability in Southeast Asia
29
and the rest of Asia."
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IV. THE SOVIEk ALLIANCE WITH VIETNAM
The formal alliance began when the Soviet Union and
Vietnam signed the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship
and Cooperation in November 1978. The informal relationship
began much earlier. The Communist movement in Vietnam had
been relatively ignored by the leadership in Moscow until
the United States became involved in Indochina in the 1960s.
By this time the United States and the Soviet Union were
economically, militarily and politically involved in the
Cold War. The United States took its stand in Southeast
Asia to fight the spread of communism, the Soviet Union
backed Vietnam through economic and military aid to show its
support against imperialistic forces and Vietnam stood in
the middle to be forever altered through the bilateral
struggle for supremacy and its own nationalistic desires.
The late 1980s saw a radical change in the internation-
al environment. The traditional alliances and rivalries
which had been comfortably ingrained for over forty years
were shaken by the events which took place within the Soviet
Union as a result of Cold War -:ompetition with the United
States. The Soviet Union was neither economically nor
diplomatically in control of itself or its empire. These
situations which could have been easily turned in to world
crises were instead the impetus which led to the end of the
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Cold War. The Soviet Union, under Mikhail Gorbachev, now
seeks a global environment in which it may put its economic
and political house in order and in which stability, reduced
tensions and security are the norm.
Gorbachev has been credited with bringing about much of
the change in the Soviet Union and consequently the interna-
tional community. As to avoid a debate as to who really
ended the Cold War, it will be accepted that President
Gorbachev's domestic initiatives, public relations campaigns
and foreign relations have had a dramatic effect on the
world. What has made these changes so important is that
they began as speeches, interviews and treaties and have
actually progressed into some verifiable actions. This
brings us to the new Soviet posture in the Far East.
Current Soviet policy in Asia is in contrast to histori-
cal involvement. During the Brezhnev era, much attention
was paid to cultivation of socialist-inclined third world
countries and surrounding its rival socialist power, the
Peoples' Republic of China (PRC); with little concern for
any of the other regional states. But all the time, it was
clear that Soviet involvement in Asia was secondary to
concerns in Europe and was always to serve in the Soviet
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Union's best interests, fluctuating to meet the changing
1
international atmosphere.
Historical alliances and enemies, conflicting goals for
Soviet policy in the region and superpower relations have
all begun to make a gradual shift so as to place the Soviet
Union in a better light. Different countries are being
courted and old friends are receiving new signals. Much of
the 'new' Soviet policy toward the Far East was revealed in
the Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk speeches and Gorbachev's
2
interview in the Indonesian paper, Merdeka. The Vladivos-
tok speech given on July 28, 1986 was delivered to a Soviet
audience but the intended recipients were a much larger
group. He invited all countries of the Pacific Rim to join
the Soviet Union in creating an area of peace and coopera-
tion. Still, he did not hesitate to emphasize that if this
fails, it will be in major part to an United States' reluc-
tance to "give up its imperialistic goals."
The Vladivostok speech and subsequent speeches, visits
and dignitarial changes all emphasize the capable diplomatic
and public relations skills of Gorbachev. Some of the more
1
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effective measures taken in the Gorbachev' public relations
campaign have been the changes in foreign service personnel,
especially those of the Far East. These include Shevard-
nadze as Foreign Minister, Vadim Medvedev as secretary of
the Central Committee's Department for Liaison with Social-
ist Countries, Igor' Rogachev as a deputy foreign minister
3
and Oleg Troyanovskiy as the ambassador to the PRC. These
new appointments have been quite effective for they replaced
an era of Brezhnevites and gave weight to Gorbachev's initi-
atives toward improved relations with the Asian neighbors.
The effect on the countries directly involved has been
positive.
The dialogue focused toward the Far East is in keeping
with the basic premise supplied by Gorbachev at Vladivostok.
The Soviet Union is an Asian nation and desires to be an
integral part of Asia.
Hence, the situation in the Far East as a whole, in Asia
and the ocean expanses washing it, where we have been
permanent inhabitants and seafarers of long standing, is
to us of national and state interest.
4
Gorbachev continues in this vein to emphasize that not
only are they an Asian nation but are seriously interested
in being involved in all changes in the economic, political
and military arenas.
3
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Our interest is in the pooling of efforts and in cooper-
ation, with full respect for each people's right to live.
as they choose and resolve their problems on their own
in conditions of peace.
5
Thus the most significant events so far to support these
claims have been the Soviet withdrawals from Afghanistan and
the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia which was encouraged
6
and supported by the Soviet Union. The positive interna-
tional environment, peace initiatives and promise of in-
creased cooperation call for a more engaged Soviet Union.
Soviet political efforts thus far have been directed at
reducing the United States' influence in the region through
appealing calls for naval arms control, calls for nuclear
free zones, reduction in foreign military basing and econom-
ic cooperation. This has been welcomed as an alternative to
the past but has yet to be judged for sincerity and motives.
A. HISTORICAL ALLIANCE AGAINST CHINESE
The Soviet and Vietnamese alliance has in the past been
significant, but with world and domestic changes it is
clearly under renovation. Vietnam is one of the poorest
countries an the world. Unemployment, starvation, years of
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left this socialist country in crisis. This situation might
not be as bad if the superpower that sustains it was not
also in a crisis situation itself.
The alliance has long been recognized as one based on
7
common goals. The Soviet Union sought to counter U.S.
influence in the region and later PRC influence. For Viet-
nam, the United States and China were both adversaries.
Early Soviet goals in Southeast Asia included power projec-
tion, promotion of its idea of socialism and at the fore-
front, to halt the spread of U.S. influence. It was an
offensive strategy which sustained the Soviet Union through
the Vietnam War. The Soviet-Vietnamese alliance evolved
based on a mutual desire to extinguish the United States
presence in Indochina. With this somewhat accomplished, the
alliance was then based on the mistrust of and desire to
contain the Chinese.
The estrangement between the Soviet Union and PRC only
served to strengthen the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance. For
the Soviets, the alliance was an essential element of their
Pacific strategy of surrounding the PRC without provoking a
Sino-Soviet military confrontation. For the Vietnamese, the
alliance provided political, economic and military support
in which they might feel safeguarded against perceived
foreign aggression. But it was also recognized by the
7
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Vietnamese for what it really was, a Soviet platform from
8
which to counter the PRC. The offensive nature of Brezh-
nev's international strategy led the Soviet Union down a
path of increased military presence and support for social-
ist countries in Asia. The political ill-effects of this
policy were foreshadowed by the strategic changes in the
region.
During North Vietnam's war with the United States Viet-
nam received military and economic assistance from the PRC
and USSR. Even though the PRC provided more quantitative
assistance, it was the USSR to which Vietnam would seek an
9
alliance at the conclusion of the war. What is the most
interesting aspect about the Soviet involvement in Vietnam
was not so much the level of their involvement as much as
the fact they were involved. They provided enough assist-
ance to be recognized as an adversary against the United
States but not enough to elicit direct US-USSR military
confrontation. This "aversion to taking major risks in
10
peripheral military conflicts" would continue to be a
characteristic of the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance against
China and even continues to the present.
8
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On November 3, 1978 in Moscow, the Soviet-Vietnamese
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed for a 25
year period. The outward reasons were political, economic
and military support, but a primary objective was to create
an alliance against the PRC. The military aspect may be the
most important component of the treaty. Still, the Soviet
Union has shied away from becoming militarily involved in
its client states' affairs, as evidenced hy the lack of
Soviet action in the 1979 border conflict between the Chi-
11
nese and Vietnamese and clashes in the South China Seas.
The treaty also served as a warning to the Chinese to avoid
getting involved in the developing conflict between Vietnam
and Cambodia. Although the warning was acknowledged by the
Chinese as a threat, it was ignored when Vietnam invaded
Cambodia and the February 1979 invasion by the PRC in to
Vietnam was the result.
Vietnam's economy was solely geared toward supporting
military conflict, first with the United States and then
into Cambodia, leaving little for the domestic needs.
Soviet security assistance provided Vietnam with the mili-
tary and economic strength to support its huge armed forces
as well as sustain the economy. In addition to the economic
assistance (estimated at US$8 billion) the Vietnamese were
11
"Soviet Friendship Treaties With Third World Coun-
tries," Department of Defense Intelligence and Defense
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able to buy essential commodities at extremely good 'friend-
12
ship' prices.
The military assistance to Vietnam has been quantita-
tively and qualitatively more significant . Soviet military
support has consisted of military hardware, machines and
materials, both new equipment and older surplus models. The
Vietnamese would not have been able to engage any size force
without this assistance. Through the critical years between
1979 and 1983, Vietnam was the fourth largest Soviet arms
13
recipient at US$5.2 billion.
... Soviet security assistance is the glue which holds
the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance together. It is what
propels the Vietnamese domination of Kampuchea and helps
to counter Chinese hostility to the north. Without it,
Vietnam would be a threat to nobody...
14
The factors making for change are the inabilities of
either the Soviets or Vietnamese to afford these conflicts.
Evidence is seen in Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia in
September 1989 and the decrease in Soviet weapons delivered
12
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to Vietnam in comparison to those countries who are paying
15
in hard currency and receiving the latest in Soviet arms.
The Soviet Union's primary benefit from the alliance with
Vietnam, however, has been a military one. In late 1978,
the Soviets gained access to the old U.S. military facili-
ties at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang. This became the largest
Soviet foreign base. The bases enabled the Soviets to
maintain, service and repair military aircraft; to have a
basing area between the Soviet Union and the Indian Ocean;
to have a tactical area for intelligence gathering; a warm
water port in the Pacific and to have presence in a region
of very strategic importance. The facilities make the
transit along the Southern Sea Route in to the Indian Ocean
easier, from an economic, security and logistical view
16
point. Cam Ranh Bay meant Soviet power projection in
Southeast Asia and beyond, specifically the Indian Ocean.
With the changes brought about by Gorbachev, the strate-
gic value of Cam Ranh Bay is being questioned. On September
16, 1988, during the Krasnoyarsk speech, Gorbachev offered
to pull out of Cam Ranh Bay in exchange for an United
States' withdrawal from the U.S. military bases in Subic Bay
and at Clark Air Base. Even though it was recognized that
15
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portation," Naval War College Review (November-December
1985): 16.
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the offer was inequitable, it spurred questions about the
validity of continued United States' presence in the Philip-
pines, especially if there were no longer a threat either
directly from the Soviets or from a Soviet-backed Vietnam.
The offer was Justifiably ignored by the United States as
negotiations for future use of the bases were soon to begin
again.
The Soviets began to unilaterally withdraw major por-
17
tions of military forces from Vietnam early in 1990. Thus
the reduction in aircraft and naval craft in Vietnam is
serving a larger global purpose for the Soviets. As part of
their new 'defensive' posture and need for better relations
in the region, the strategic importance of bases in Vietnam
has been substantially reduced. The publicity of the with-
drawal gives added proof to the Soviet public relations
strategy of 'putting their money where their mouth is.' This
withdrawal has been beneficial for the Soviet's position in
Southeast Asia as well as for those advocating a United
States reduction of military forces and use of foreign
bases.
17
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B. ESCALATION IN COSTS, REDUCTION IN BENEFITS (Post 1989
Period)
The military and strategic benefits for the Soviets have
been undeniable but signs that costs are beginning to erode
these benefits are becoming ever more apparent. The securi-
ty assistance has not produced a more stable, self-suffi-
cient country. Vietnam, shunned from the international
environment as a result of its involvement in Cambodia, has
totally depended on the Soviet's aid. While Vietnam was
engrossed in conflict and supported by a wartime economy and
outside assistance, much of the world began a transition to
an era where economic power is as important as military
power. Vietnam has been left behind. A Vietnamese joke
about the 1980's relationship between Vietnam and the Soviet
Union is, "Moscow, rejecting a desperate cry for help,
cables Vietnam: "Tighten your belts." To which Vietnam
18
replies: "Send belts."
The economic crisis in the Soviet Union has necessitated
a reevaluation of its involvement with desperately poor
"allied" states. Savings have been sought by the Gorbachev
administration through the reduction in military and econom-
19
ic assistance. The costs are even harder to justify when
18
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the receiving country is in economic shambles, disregards
advice from the lender and shows little sign of improving in
the near future. However, it has not been the economic aid
that has created the greatest expenditure. The greatest
expenditure has been diplomatic. With Gorbachev's new
overtures to the U.S., the PRC, and ASEAN, the costs of high
military and economic assistance to Vietnam have diminished
the benefits.
The primary benefit the Soviet Union derived was from
the uncomfortable positions of the United States and the PRC
brought on by the Soviet military basing in Vietnam. Gorba-
chev has acknowledged that "security must henceforth be
20
pursued by political and economic means," thus reducing
the security benefits derived from military presence. It
appears that new benefits will be afforded the Soviet Union
through regional acknowledgement of peaceful Soviet initia-
tives and recognition of the positive influence made by the
Soviets on a Cambodian settlement. Improved status in the
region and allowance to maintain a significant alliance with
Vietnam are the new benefits. It appears economics rather
21
than ideology now rules the Soviet day, a fact the Vietna-
mese discount, but one their decrepit socialist economy must
face.
20
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C. THE CHANGING EMPHASIS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF SOUTHEAST
ASIA
The Soviet support of Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia
has been the major stumbling block between the countries of
ASEAN and the Soviet Union. A goal of the Soviet Union has
been to establish ties with the pro-Western, economically
successful countries in Southeast Asia. However, while the
Soviets supported Vietnam, few cultural or economic ex-
changes were ever made. Where the Soviet Union may have
been willing to risk ASEAN condemnation, the strategic value
of the Vietnam aliance was worth it.
This case is no longer so apparent. At the same time
the Soviets are attempting not to alienate Vietnam by their
economic and military retreat and positive overtures to the
PRC, they are actively pursuing improved relations with
ASEAN. The perceived decline of United State's influence in
the region and increased bilateral tensions over trade,
military bases, and nuclear issues, have provided the Soviet
Union with a unique opportunity to improve its position.
These, in conjunction with Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambo-
dia and published Soviet military reductions in Southeast
Asia, have opened the door considerably for high level state
visits.
President Gorbachev has stated he wishes to improve
relations with the individual countries of ASEAN and ASEAN
as a whole. Since 1987, Shevardnadze has visited Thailand,
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Indonesia and the Philippines in his tours through Southeast
Asia. Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines
have reciprocated by sending delegations, including several
foreign ministers and prime ministers, to Moscow. ASEAN
states have welcomed the Soviet peace initiatives but have
22
remain cautious.
The importance of Southeast Asia to the Soviet Union is
two-fold. First, it is an economic success story and in-
creased trade, technology transfer and investment can be
very beneficial to Gorbachev's economic agenda. The Soviet
Far East is expected to have great potential as a source for
oil and other raw resources and joint ventures and invest-
23
ment from Southeast Asia would help considerably. The
second reason is the United States' influence in the region.
Closer economic and diplomatic ties may help loosen the ties
ASEAN has created with the West.
The future for Soviet-ASEAN relations should be a gradu-
al move toward better relations. Neither appear to be ready
to totally abandon their old alliances. The Soviet Union
and Vietnam are still allied. ASEAN is still very much pro-
West, wary of communism, and is unsure of what the future
holds for Gorbachev. it is not yet clear whether the small
22
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potential offered by an opening Soviet economy will be




The Soviet Union became very concerned about a two-front
war when it broke relations with communist China in the
1960s. The Soviet response to the crisis was a massive
military buildup along the Sino-Soviet border. The PRC
responded both with its own military buildup and with public
incrimination of the Soviet Union. Clashes along the bor-
der, the 1969 Ussuri River crisis being the prime example,
drove the wedge between the two communist giants even fur-
ther. The PRC alliance with the United States in the early
1970s and the peace treaty with Japan in 1978, gave strong
signals that the Soviet military and political encirclement
of China was being taken quite seriously. Thereupon, the
alliances between the PRC and the West added fuel to the
c)viet initiatives to strengthen its military position in
the Pacific, especially with its militarily strong and anti-
Chinese ally -- Vietnam. Even into the late 1970s and early
1980s, large combined military exercises by the Soviet Union
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The PRC proclaimed three obstacles lay between renewed,
normalized relations between the Soviet Union and itself.
The obstacles were the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, Soviet
military forces along the Sino-Soviet border (including
Mongolia), and the Soviet support to Vietnam's occupation of
Cambodia. President Gorbachev has stressed that renewed
relations with China are a priority and the actions taken to
alleviate these obstacles are proof. The withdrawal of
Soviet forces from Afghanistan was announced during the
Vladivostok speech and officially signed into being with the
26
Geneva Accords in April 1988. In early 1989, both Gorba-
chev and Shevardnadze announced troop reductions along the
27
Sino-Soviet Border to the tune of over 250,000 troops. On
the third obstacle, though it was not publicly apparent that
the Soviets were the significant factor, the Vietnamese did
announce and then remove all troops from Cambodia in Septem-
ber 1989.
The Soviet Union's efforts to improve its relationship
with the PRC through reduction in border military strength,
Afghanistan and in the Cambodian conflict have contributed
to Sino-Soviet detente. Economic relations have gradually
improved significantly through the eighties resulting in
increases in trade, cooperative joint ventures and foreign
26
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aid to the PRC. Arms trade negotiations and exchanges have
even begun. The Soviet Union has remained relatively quiet
and removed on China's security concerns over the Tianammen
issue and over Sino-Vietnamese clashes in the South China
Seas.
Factors which are contributing to improved Sino-Soviet
relations are primarily derived from internal Soviet changes
affecting their entire global initiatives. Both countries
rea.ize that decreased military tensions can result in
reduced military budgets, thus providing alternative savings
for social and economic programs. The troop reductions
along their border will go a long way in saving funds much
needed in their free market economies. Modernization pro-
grams will also benefit in this new political environment.
"Moscow's principal objective of normalizing relations
(with China) was achieved, although at a cost no previous
28
Soviet leader had been willing to pay." Vietnam's concern
was that Soviet detente with China had been achieved at the
expense of Vietnam. Even though the relationship between
the PRC and Soviet Union has taken years to warm up, there
were still signs of differences of opinion brought on by
29
years of confrontation . The subsequent lack of Soviet
responses to come to the Vietnamese aid was significantly
28
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important. The March 1988 Spratly Islands incident is a
case in point.
The most important aspect of this emerging USSR-PRC
detente for Vietnam may rest in the future aspirations of
China. if these intentions are fueled by external security
concerns and desire for domination of regional powers it may
lead to a period of unrest and ultimately military confron-
tation. If neither the Soviet Union nor any other countries
choose to challenge Chinese designs on the South China Seas
or a rematch of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict in 1979, Viet-
nam may find itself forced toward war as has been done so
often in past when faced with a perceived Chinese threat.
E. ALLIANCE PROSPECTS -- SHAKY FUTURE
The Soviet-Vietnamese alliance is changing. What was
once their strongest bonding factor, their distrust of
China, is now eroding. Sino-Soviet relations are warming;
it is Vietnam's nightmare that they may be betrayed to their
greatest threat. The Soviets have increasingly encouraged
the Vietnamese to talk with its neighbors in China and
30
Cambodia. The Soviet Union's economic hardships and new
diplomatic posture are evidenced in the Soviet military
scale down in Vietnam and Soviet political advances in
Southeast Asia.
30
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The Soviet Union has been pursuing relationships which
are contrary to Vietnamese national security interests.
There is Soviet disappointment as a result of the failure to
see positive results from the billions of dollars in econom-
ic aid. The relationship, which was never on the friendli-
est terms, has soured even more as economic and political
pressures are placed on the alliance. The relationship
which began on an ideological basis is now being overcome by
economic realities.
The alliance was created to thwart efforts in Indochina
first by the United States and then by the PRC. Vietnam
found itself surrounded by unfriendly neighbors as a result
of its invasion into Cambodia and cut off from all non-
Soviet assistance to fund the military and the economy. The
Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries provided these
necessities. The shake up and failures in the socialist
world have changed this. The Soviet Union is no longer
receiving sufficient benefits to justify the military,
political or diplomatic costs of supporting or aligning with
Vietnam to the same degree it has in the past.
The alliance will be different. It is evolving into an
alliance which is less threatening and less alienating to
its neighbors. The era of substantial military and economic
aid, subsidies and discount prices for commodities such as
fertilizer and oil will come to an end by December 1990.
Trade between the two countries will be based on
68
international pricing terms vice unilateral support by the
31
Soviet Union. Will this new alliance be threatening? Not
if it allows each country to benefit from the economic and
technological success stories in Southeast Asia and Asia as
a whole. Not if a solution to the Cambodian conflict arises
due to the decreased military assistance and improved polit-
ical relations. It can go sour however if the leadership in
Vietnam feels isolated, abandoned, and threatened from
radical changes in the socialist world and from within its
own society.
A major factor as to whether this new alliance will be a
regional stabilizer or destabilizer is the true intentions
of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev's references to "brutal and
cynical counteraction" to socialism, Vietnam's "heroic
experiences" and old friendships based on "equality" still
being vital to security in Asia give evidence he may not yet
be willing to give up his strategic place in Southeast Asia
or his challenge to the United States' dominance in the
32
region. Military presence and continuing construction
projects in Cam Ranh suggest there is still a strategic
security aspect to the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance.
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Moreover, the "miniature" naval arms race in Southeast Asia
is evidence that the ASEAN nations are not quite so sure
33
stability is right around the corner.
Those who predict that the weakening of Soviet power
will lead to a benevolent international order have only
paid attention to the benefits associated with the
diminishing Soviet Threat, and not to the new problems
emerging as a result of Soviet decline.
34
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V. THE UNITED STATES' STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
United States' interests in Southeast Asia are rooted in
the past, have great importance in the present and will
remain vital in the future. The twentieth century has seen
the United States as a peripheral state, as a prominent
state, a militarily and economically engaged state in South-
east Asia, but its presence is always effective to a certain
degree. The interests have changed as a result of domestic
changes and transformations in the region. Today, March
1991, the United States faces a Southeast Asia which too is
feeling shock waves from the end of the Cold War, continued
economic progress and potential for a reaceful settlement of
a military conflict which has consumed the region for over
ten years. Even with war in the Persian Gulf, the United
States can neither push aside nor neglect its opportunities
and obligations in every other area in the world.
The Southeast Asia region remains important to the
United States because we have important allies in this
unstable region and we are all of different minds about how
to deal with Vietnam. The security umbrella that has been
provided in the past to encourage economic progress, dis-
courage hegemonic tendencies on the part of others and
provide a balance of power is now looking more costly to the
American people and is looked upon as less than necessary by
some regional countries. Soviet military build-up, the
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Philippine bases, diplomatic ties to Thailand, the Cambodian
conflict, strategic sea lanes and allies in the region
(specifically Australia) have all been major political
1
concerns in Southeast Asia, but at present they must share
the spotlight with our economic dilemmas.
With the emergence of the Newly Industrialized Countries
(NICs) and Japan's preeminent role as investor, benefactor
and business partner in Southeast Asia, the United States
has found itself in the red with some and no longer the
primary trade partner with all. Nevertheless, most coun-
tries still welcome U.S. trade and investment over other
western and regional powers, especially Japan. This preemi-
nence accounts for the fact that a substantial military
presence is still advocated by the U.S. Department of De-
fense (DOD). At the same time, the DOD has recognized and
respects the nationalistic changes in individual countries,
the reduced Soviet threat and the United States' own domes-
tic problems. Consequently, it has advocated a small and
1
Muthiah Alagappa, "The major powers and Southeast Asia,"
International Journal, XLIL (Summer 1989): 545-548; and
Justis M. van der Kroef, "The United States and Southeast
Asia: Some Future Strategic Realities," P Focus IV,
No. 1 (Spring 1989): 44.
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2gradual reduction of forward deployed military forces.
Above all else, there is significant wealth in Southeast
Asia. While this wealth must be adequately exploited, we
cannot blind ourselves to the need for safeguarding civil
and human rights on the part of governments which are some-
times inclined to be careless in these matters.
A. ALLIANCE WITH ASEAN
As a result of the Vietnam War, the Unites States'
policy in Southeast Asia was altered. Since then it has
been focused on a relationship with the ASEAN countries,
with comparatively very little political involvement in the
region as opposed to economic and security associations.
The United States' position has in the past been centered
around bilateral military and trade agreements, leaving it
to ASEAN to take the lead in the most pressing problem of
the region -- Cambodia. Military ties with ASEAN have
included joint exercises, sales of high-tech military equip-
ment, combined operations, and exchange of military educa-
tion and training. The recent United States access to naval
repair and storage facilities under the invitation of the
Singaporean government emphasizes a continued mutual strate-
gic interest to maintain some U.S. military presence in
2
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Interna-
tional Affairs (East Asia and Pacific Region), A
Framework fo th= Asian Pacific Rim. LookinQ Toward The 212t
Century, Report To Congress ([Washington, D.C.]: U.S. De-
partment of Defense, April 1990), 1.
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Southeast Asia in light of possible decreases in the Philip-
pines.
The future of the U.S.-ASEAN alliance will be reflective
of the changes within each entity in aspects of security,
economics and politics. The anti-communist tie which once
joined the United States and ASEAN together has been weak-
ened by the Soviet Union's drastic changes. "The U.S.
approach to security in the area must give new emphasis to
mutual concerns and cooperation and to policies and actions
based on consensual diplomacy and consultation among
3
equals." The countries of ASEAN are in themselves search-
ing for a more prominent place in the world community. As a
result of a relatively stable environment, these countries
have become the most economically successful grouping of
4
developing countries. And now as the major connecting
force, the Cambodian conflict, begins to diminish and super-
power military reductions are foreseeable, ASEAN may be
tempted by a more non-aligned policy. There may well be
less need to depend on the United States. Southeast Asia
will likely have less need of American presence as an alter-
native to Soviet or Chinese influence.
3
David I. Hitchcock, Jr., "The United States In A Chang-
ing Pacific Rim: Asian Perceptions and the U.S. Response,"
Thb& Washington Quarterly 12, No. 4 (Autumn 1989): 135.
4
David G. Bradford, "Asia-Pacific Policy: A Review of the
Literature," The W.hing Ouarrlj 13, No. 2 (Spring
1990): 197.
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B. LEGACY OF THE VIETNAM WAR
On January 27, 1973, an agreement between the United
States and Vietnam was signed effectively ending the Second
Indochina War. By March, all remaining U.S. combat units
were proclaimed to be out of Vietnam. April 1975, less than
two years after withdrawal, saw South Vietnam fall to the
North and surrender. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam
(SRV) was officially proclaimed on July 2, 1976. Through
much of 1977, Vietnam and the United States were on opposite
tracks. Demanding promised war reparation payments from the
United States and virtually ignoring the residual MIA/POW
questions, the Vietnamese sacrificed any chance of agreement
with the approach of the Carter Administration in normaliz-
5
ing relations. Since then the major legacies of the Viet-
nam War: MIA/POWs, refugee problems and Amerasians have
perpetuated the gap between the United States and Vietnam.
According to the National League of Families of American
Priscners and Missing in Southeast Asia there are 2,393
Americans yet unaccounted for in Indochina. The Department
6
of Defense estimates the number to be just higher at 2,398.
Though endeavors by many orficial and unofficial sources
have resulted in some increased cooperation with the
5
Justus M. van der Kroef, "The United States And Vietnam:
The Imperati'.es of Reconciliation," Current Research on




Vietnamese and the result has been the return of several
remains, the U.S. interpretation of the negotiations on this
subject still tends to put the Vietnamese in a negative
light. Accusations and rumors that the Vietnamese have
"warehouses full of American remains which they move to
avoid detection", as well as "supposed sightings of Ameri-
cans still held in Vietnam" do nothing to assuage American
opinion. If it is in the national interest of Vietnam to
achieve better relations with the United States, the POW/MIA
issue will have to be dealt with in a manner more satisfac-
tory to the United States. This may not come easily to the
Vietnamese. The meetings in Washington in October 1990
between political appointee John Vessey, Jr. and
Vietnam's Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach again highlighted
the political and emotional problems surrounding the MIA/POW
issues. Promises were renewed to give the utmost attention
to overcoming this dilemma that continues to hinder better
relations.
Even though the initial Vietnamese refugee problem was a
result of the Vietnam War and South Vietnamese attempts to
escape retribution for their part against the North, the
intensity of the problem has steadily grown. A new batch of
refugees was made up of Chinese formerly living in Vietnam
who either sought political safety or escape from discrimi-
natory economic practices and regulations. A significant
number of Chinese either sought a better life, escaped from
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reeducatio: camps or had just found a convenient means to
leave Vietnam. The latter groups could not be accepted as
refugees but were merely classed as economic escapees. As
such they could not be granted the status of "political
asylum" in third countries. The refugee problem has fes-
tered to include not only Vietnam and the United States but
those countries which are considered 'first asylum' coun-
tries as well. Many of the ASEAN states are first asylum
countries as well as Hong Kong and Taiwan. The surplus of
so called "refugees" awaiting scr ning and those who have
already been screened have been congregated in large camps
causing a financial burden and an explosive situation to the
host countries. One of the most trying difficulties emerg-
ing out of the refugee problem is repatriation. Once a
first asylum country has screened a refugee and determined
that the person is not an official refugee but an economic
migrant, the process becomes more difficult for humanitarian
and financial reasons. How can a person be sent back to
Vietnam to confront a cruel or uncertain fate?
Sympathetic concern for the welfare of the refugees is
becoming less and less apparent in the first asylum coun-
tries. The uncontrollable growth of the refugee camps is
seen to have been compounded by the United States' decision
to open direct dialogue with Vietnam. This was once seen as
leverage to guarantee Vietnamese cooperation on refugees and
with this gone, the future may be even worse for Vietnamese
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seeking a new life in other countries. Piracy, increased
cases ofpush-offs and forced repatriation may be the even-
tual fat{. A smooth reintegration of Vietnam in Southeast
Asia may ultimately rest in the Vietnamese government's
management of the problem which has regional as well as
world wide repercussions. It is in the United States'
interest to contribute more effectively to the solution of
this troubling situation.
The Orderly Departure Program (ODP) initiated in 1980 by
the United States, has been considered a major step in the
right direction. It was expanded to include the Amerasians
-- the children of American servicemen and Vietnamese women.
In 1987, the Amerasian Homecoming Act was passed to allow
these people and their families unlimited entry into the
7
United States. The Amerasians have endured hardships in
Vietnam as a result of discrimination and problems inherent
in the country i'tse]f. This act has assured first asylum
countries and processing stations that this group of people
should not burden their systems too long. The continued and
expanded application of this act is clearly in the American
national interest.
7
Jonathan Moore, "Thia way out," FUR (12 July 1990): 54-
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C. SOLUTION TO THE CAMBODIAN PROBLEM
The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 brought
indochina back into the international spotlight after a
small reprieve since the Vietnam War. The solution to the
conflict was sought in the form of Vietnamese troop with-
drawal. Diplomatic and economic sanctions were levied on
Vietnam while China and the Soviet Union were encouraged to
discontinue support of their respective clients in the
Cambodian conflict. Vietnam, the Soviet Union, ASEAN, China
and the United States all have histories of regional con-
flicting interests, changing alliances and unhealthy rela-
tionships primarily centering around Cambodia. By the date
of writing this thesis (March 1991), the end of the Cambodi-
an conflict is nowhere in sight.
Vietnam's fundamental position in Cambodia is that it
must support a friendly government in Phome Penh (such as
that of Hun Sen) in order to protect its own interest in
Cambodia. China of course supports Pol Pot. The United
States does not like either the position of Vietnam or
China, but if it must choose ,it prefers Vietnam to China.
Under no circumstances does the United States want the
return of Pol Pot.
Vietnam's involvement in its neighboring country has
8
resulted in their wearing of a "Cambodian albatross".
8
Alagappa, "The major powers," 585.
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It has been economically, militarily and diplomatically
taxing both for itself and its sponsor state, the Soviet
Union. On the surface it appears Vietnam has supported
United Nations' efforts to arrive at a peaceful solution in
Cambodia and the creation of the Supreme National Council
(SNC). The interested nations in the UN still maintain that
for a settlement to be lasting, worthwhile and effective it
will have to be made from within the country, an argument
which appears to stem from the United States' insistence
that Vietnam play an integral part in the peaceful settle-
ment.
The U.N. Security Council agreed in late August 1990 to
the components of a settlement. These included "U.N. super-
vision of an interim government, military arrangements for
the transitional period, free elections, human-rights pro-
tection, guarantees for the neutrality of a future
9
Cambodia" and the formation of the SNC. These terms appear
to be in vain as long as the four factions within Cambodia
cannot agree to the U.N. resolution or even make it past the
battlefields to the negotiating tables. Evidence that this
may be the case is increasingly surfacing and highlighting
the historical internal and regional differences.
United States' involvement in the Cambodian conflict has
consisted of peripheral support of the anti-communist
9
"Security Council agrees on Cambodian compromise," FEER
(6 September 1990): 14.
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factions of Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann and leading an
embargo against Vietnam. As part of the legacy of the war
against North Vietnam, a U.S. embargo in place after 1964,
was boosted after Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978. This
embargo was for the most part fully supported by Western
nations, Japan and ASEAN for over ten years. It was used
as one of the major tools in the negotiating process with
Vietnam when discussing their involvement in a peaceful
Cambodian settlement.
Many U.S. oil and mining companies, banks, and others
looking to invest, produce and take advantage of Vietnam's
natural resources and abundant, cheap labor have begun to
feel they were being hurt by the U.S.-led embargo. Many
U.S. allies and ASEAN countries were already actively en-
gaged in private and joint ventures within Vietnam, gaining
a worrisome and insurmountable lead over the United States,
should the United States conclude an agreement which would
permit its reentry into the Vietnam market.
The efforts directed by U.S. companies and private
persons have been more recently heightened by members of
Congress. An increasing number of Congressman have support-
ed a lifting of the embargo to help U.S. companies engage
the growing phenomenon in Vietnam while at the same time
10
they were especially aware of the sensitive MIA/POW issue.
10
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United States concern over Khmer Rouge advances on the
battlefield and growing strength within the country has
prompted a dramatic change in U.S. policy. In July 1990,
the United States elected to begin talks directly with the
Phnom Penh government headed by Hun Sen and with Vietnam.
This action was met with disappointment by ASEAN for fear it
might negate efforts already accomplished in multilateral
talks. A U.S. bill was passed by Congress in October 1990,
to now give $25 mi.lion in aid to areas under Phnom Penh's
11
rule. The change in policy was partially a result of the
Administration's deduction that talking directly with Viet-
nam and Phnom Penh was better than the possibility of seeing
12
the Khmer Rouge come back in power in Cambodia.
D. PRIMARY FORCE BEHIND EFFORTS TO REINTEGRATE VIETNAM INTO
SOUTHEAST ASIA
There is nothing more difficult to take in hand,
more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its
success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a
new order of things.
13
Machiavelli
There are some very important considerations that the
United States must take into account when considering where
11
Clifford Krauss, "With Gains by Khmer Rouge, Congress
Looks to Hun Sen," New York Times (31 October 1990): A8.
12
"Vietnam's turn," The Economist 316, No. 7667 (August
11, 1990): 38.
13
Paul H. Kreisburg, "Containment's Last Gasp," Foreign
Policy 75 (Summer 1989): 163.
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to place Southeast Asia in its foreign policy planning.
Even though it is infinitely weaker, the Soviet Union still
has strategic interests in Southeast Asia. With a conse-
quential amount of United States' economic and political
interest in China, her role and interests in Southeast Asia
must be reassessed. There is world-wide interest in the
economic potential of Southeast Asia and in the stategic
sea lanes of communication which are vital to several na-
tions' livelihoods. There are states in and around South-
east Asia with ambitions for leadership. Finally, the
United States history suggests that though we may not place
a high priority on areas considered to be Third World, that
14
is where we are most likely to get involved in a conflict.
With all of these factors playing on the stability of the
region, the United States needs to consider the role it
should play in the entire ASEAN region. It must ask whether
the Southeast Asia Collective Defence treaty meets the
requirements of a post-Cold War world?
As in other areas all over the world, change is in
motion. Change is occurring with less trauma in Southeast
Asia than in some areas, the Middle East for example. What
is key to the United States' role in Southeast Asia is our
long established influence, respectability and "unique
ability to interact effectively on essential issues with
14
David, "Third World Matters," 54.
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15
more states than any other nation in the region." The
future challenges the U.S. will face in Southeast Asia will
not likely come from an accustomed direction -- military
engagements, but from the strife caused by economic and
political turbulence domestically and regionally within
Southeast Asia.
As of now the United States is linked by treaty to the
Philippines and Thailand; and by extension to the interests
of Pakistan, the United Kingdom, France, Australia and New
Zealand in the area. This reflects the tilt to the anti-
Communist combine. It completely overlooks the interests of
the United States either in the non-aligned nations of
Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and
Burma) and in a new relationship with Cambodia, Laos and its
former enemy Vietnam. As the new status of all these na-
tions develop, it is ever more clear that the United States
must review the commitments that were made when the threat
of China and the Soviet Union were perceived to be at their
gravest.
15
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A. VIETNAM'S PRIORITIES SHOULD BE GIVEN DUE CONSIDERATION
More and more regional and global attention is being
paid to Vietnam's efforts at economic renovation and diplo-
matic endeavors. The World Bank and IMF have lauded Viet-
*1
nam's foreign investment laws. ASEAN, Japan, and several
Western countries have diplomatically sidetracked the embar-
go on Vietnam to reap early economic benefits. Vietnam has
withdrawn its troops from Cambodia and has cooperated moder-
ately in efforts to bring the conflict to the negotiating
table.
As far as the United States is officially concerned, a
Cambodian settlement and the POW/MIA issue are most impor-
tant to future bilateral connections. A detailed, accessi-
ble and energetic beginning of renewed efforts to find all
the remaining and unaccounted for Americans would be a
significant step in changing United States-Vietnamese rela-
tions. It is conceivable that the true motive or direction
planned for Vietnam by its leaders is not completely known,
but a diplomatic presence within the country could afford
1
Clyde H. Farnsworth, "U.S. Urged To End Hanoi Trade
Curb," New Xx Times (October 9, 1990): C14.
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the United States a better view from which to gauge furtber
actions, and a new locus for conducting formal negotiations.
B. CHINA'S INFLUENCE ON VIETNAM'S FUTURE COURSE
Although China and Vietnam are historical foes and a
future diplomatic relationship may be complicated because of
domestic and regional differences, the China factor cannot
be eliminated by the United States in setting a new course
for US-SRV relations. Due to the size of China, its popula-
tion, its military and potential power, it is not a country
to be ignored. Most important though is the domestic poli-
cies and political instability and the econcmic morass
2
within which the PRC is mired. For these reasons of insta-
bility and historical differences, Vietnam should not be
driven into a situation where it is vulnerable to unsolicit-
ed interference without outside sources of assistance.
Likewise, Vietnam should not be placed at the mercy of
Chinese diplomatic. Vietnam has been known to prosper more
3
when the Chinese threat is perceived to be lower.
2
Roger W. Sullivan, "China and America in a Post-Cold
War Environment," Thep China B Review 17, No. 3 (May-
June 1990): 20.
3
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C. THE SOVIET UNION'S DEPENDABILITY IN VIETNAM'S FUTURE
4
Whether it is a "tactic of seduction" or new diplomacy,
Gorbachev's agenda for the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia
appears to have decreasing room for Vietnam. According to
John W. Coffey, who served in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense during the late Reagan years, there are several
hidden "objectives" in Gorbachev's strategy which primarily
focus on drawing the United States into situations which are
nonbeneficial. The Soviet stance in Southeast Asia may be
seductive as this analysis suggests.
On the other hand, there appears to be more important
Soviet concerns in Souther-st Asia than continued support for
its client, Vietnam. Vietnam has proven to be unprofitable
economically and diplomatically. A Soviet abandonment of
Vietnam in order to recover domestically and to advance
USSR/PRC and USSR/ASEAN relations opens a new vista for
American policy. It is not to America's advantage to have
Vietnam driven into a corner which would make it more ag-
gressive. The Soviet Union can not play the significant
role in Viet.nam's reintegration for reasons of domestic
economic problems, its diplomatic embarrassments and its
ideological bankruptcy. This leaves the door wide open to
step gingerly into the breach. By extending a helping hand
to Vietnam, it can gain good will from Vietnam and reduce
4
John W. Coffey, "New Thinking Or New Tactics In Soviet
Foreign Policy?" Global Affairs IV (Winter 1989): 96.
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the cogency of the Soviet threat which has centered in the
Soviet-Vietnam alliance and particularly in the existence of
the Soviet use of Cam Ranh Bay.
D. THE UNITED STATES -- PRIMARY FORCE BEHIND A POSITIVE
PLACE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA FOR VIETNAM
A major point forwarded by David Hitchcock when discuss-
ing the future role of the United States in the Pacific Rim
was the United States' presence enhances regional coopera-
tion. This position is most reasonable. The U.S. does not
have to be the initiator or driving force, just the presence
is enough to provide stability for beneficial, collective5
development. "Essentially, the role of the United States
must be to help Asian problem solvers rather than to solve
6
Asian problems." Once before the United States risked
losing its influence in Southeast Asia. Alliances with the
United States had been threatened by our performance in
Vietnam. Today, failure to recognize the changes or to go
with the flow of change, if not lead it, may result in our
loss of influence in this entire region. The United States'
interests in Southeast Asia must be safeguarded. "This is
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ifn determining the exact role the United States should
play with regards to Vietnam, two very important facts
should be considered. The first fact is that the subject of
direct relations with Vietnam is a very emotional one. This
is Qne issue which cannot be solely couched in diplomatic,
economic or political terms. What may be a sound, well-
researched policy, one clearly in the long run interests of
the United States, will confront resistance if the emotional
side is not taken into consideration. The second fact is
that on a scale of importance of the United States' national
interests, normalization with Vietnam is not very high.
This may just be a direct result of the first fact or that
we do not see Vietnam as threatening or threatened in her
present situation. Based on these facts though, the prob-
lems between the two countries will have to be acknowledged
and addressed to the mutual satisfaction of both.
The key phrase in viewing the evolving United States-8
Vietnam relationship may be "steady progress". Even though
the decisions made in July 1990 regarding changed U.S.
posture toward the Cambodian leadership issues and contact
with Vietnam may have resulted in regional and global jolts,
they were diplomatically well designed, executed and posi-
tive. With appearances of having equivocated in the past,
current U.S. policy on future relations with Vietnam still
8
Susuma Awanohara, "Progress in action," Feer (11 October
1990): 24.
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require significant Vietnamese cooperation in a peaceful
Cambodian settlement. In turn, visible efforts by Vietnam
9
are required to account for POW/MIAs. The ends of American
policy are clear, the sensible formula is to take it slow
and easy.
It is in the United States' national interest to see
Vietnam not solely dependent upon one country but have a
varied number of eastern and western partners. Likewise, it
is in the national interest to see Vietnam as a stable,
contributing, progressing country eager to talk with the
U.S. over historical and future bilateral issues. A Vietnam
in which the United States has a significant level of in-
volvement and influence as a result of direct relations will
help ensure that the Southeast Asian region, with all of its
strategic importance, will be more favorably balanced toward
U.S. interests. Several barriers still exist. These are
domestic, bilateral and multilateral dilemmas which may take
years to overcome. By the United States opening direct
dialogue with Vietnam and supporting an embargo lift, a
positive relationship may contribute to removing some of
these barriers.
9
Clifford Krauss, "Vietnam To Renew Effort On Missing,"
New York Times (October 18, 1990): A4.
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